Safe Mode and OT safety
Safe Mode
Safe Mode is enabled by default in the desktop and on the CLI. --fast (or unchecking Safe Mode) turns it off.
| Safe Mode (default) | --fast | |
|---|---|---|
| Active hosts at once | at most 8 | --workers (default 1024, max 4096) |
| Spacing between application probes | at least 100 ms (token bucket) | none, unless --rate PPS |
| Port probes per host in parallel | at most 4 | --parallel (default 64) |
| SYN scan, ARP sweep | disabled | opt-in |
| Traceroute | ICMP only | ICMP, TCP, UDP |
| SMB NTLM SESSION_SETUP | not sent | sent (no AUTHENTICATE) |
| TLS 1.3 suite enumeration | not sent | sent |
| OT operations | identification only | identification only |
In the desktop the disabled controls are greyed out. Safe Mode is a conservative traffic profile, not a guarantee for every PLC.
Rules that always apply
These hold with Safe Mode on or off:
- All OT protocol operations are read-only identification: no writes, no program or block access, no control commands, no authentication. See OT / industrial for exactly what is sent.
- OT identification runs only on standard ports. TCP probes go only to hosts with that port open; a silent host gets at most one BACnet Who-Is, and only when nonresponders are scanned.
- Generic service probes never touch industrial ports (102, 502, 4840, 44818, 47808 and similar).
- Printer ports 9100-9107 and 515 only get a passive banner wait; nothing is ever sent.
- 2222/tcp is listen-only unless it greets with SSH.
- The UDP scan never sends to industrial or printer ports; such ports in
--udp-portsare skipped with a host note and probes listing them are rejected. - TCP traceroute never uses OT or printer ports.
- Passive modes (
listen,ot-listen, pcap import) send nothing. A test fails the build if the passive modules contain socket or send code. - Nothing scans automatically; every scan starts with an explicit Start or command.
The read-only promise is a type, not a convention
The active OT code (src/ot.rs, src/ot/) cannot send a write or control request, because such a request has no value in the type system:
- Every OT request is built by
ot::readonlyfrom an allow-list enum:ModbusFunction,S7Szl,EnipCommand,BacnetService,OpcUaMessage. The request types (ModbusRequest,S7Request,EnipRequest,BacnetRequest,OpcUaRequest) have private fields, so the enums are the only way in. - The only functions that put OT bytes on a socket,
OtStream::sendandOtUdp::send, accept nothing but aReadOnlyRequest. That trait is sealed (onlyot::readonlyimplements it) and is not implemented for&[u8]. The rest of the OT code holds sockets only through these wrappers, which can read but not write; a test fails the build ifot.rsorot/opcua.rsuse a raw socket orwrite_all. - Sending anything else needs a new enum variant, which is a reviewed code change, and the tests fail until the allow-list in the test is changed deliberately too.
What the allow-lists contain (exactly what is sent today):
| Protocol | Allowed |
|---|---|
| Modbus/TCP | function 0x2B with MEI type 0x0E (Read Device Identification); not the other MEI types (for example 0x0D CANopen), not any write or diagnostic function |
| S7comm | COTP connection request, Setup communication (job function 0xF0), Userdata CPU functions / Read SZL for SZL 0x0011 and 0x001C; no Read/Write Var, PLC control or stop, download, upload or block access |
| EtherNet/IP | encapsulation command 0x0063 (List Identity); no SendRRData, SendUnitData or sessions |
| BACnet/IP | unicast Who-Is (unconfirmed service 8); no confirmed requests (ReadProperty, WriteProperty, ReinitializeDevice) and no broadcast BVLC function |
| OPC UA | HEL, OpenSecureChannel (node 446), GetEndpoints (428), FindServers (422), CloseSecureChannel (452), SecurityPolicy None; no CreateSession, Read, Write or Call |
Tests (cargo test) check this for every possible byte: all 256 function codes (and all 65,536 MEI/group/subfunction pairs, EtherNet/IP commands and OPC UA node IDs) are accepted by the constructors exactly when they are on the allow-list, every encoded request decodes back to an allow-listed service, changing any discriminator byte of an encoded request to any other value is rejected, and the encoded bytes equal the literals used before the types existed. compile_fail doctests in ot::readonly show that a Modbus write, an S7 stop and a raw &[u8] send do not compile.
Limits of the guarantee: it covers the active OT requests listed above. The Profinet DCP Identify frame (dcp, built in passive.rs) and the generic service probes are separate code paths with their own tests and deny lists, and the type does not say anything about what a device does with a read-only request.
Recommendations for plant networks
- Read-only traffic can still affect fragile equipment. Older controllers, serial gateways and devices with small TCP stacks may slow down, drop connections or fault under any active traffic.
- Prefer passive discovery (
ot-listenon a SPAN port or an existing capture) on production OT networks. - Coordinate with operations before an active scan, scan during a maintenance window, and start with a small target range.
- Keep Safe Mode on. Do not use
--fast,--synor--arp-sweepagainst control networks. - Know how to stop: Stop in the desktop, or Q/Escape in the TUI, saves what was collected.
See also Responsible use.